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HOW ONE LAW REVIEW ARTICLE TRANSFORMED
THE LAW OF NEW MEXICO FOREVER (NOT!)
TED OCCHIALINO*
INTRODUCTION
I consider myself to be a fine teacher and a mediocre scholar. Returning to one
of my law review articles, Separation of Powers and the Judicial Rule-Making
Power in New Mexico: The Need for Prudential Constraints,1 twenty-five years after
its publication, largely confirms the latter self-assessment, at least in the eyes of the
judges and fellow academics who have only occasionally cited the article. Nonetheless, the substantial effort that went into the article was worth the effort. The article has played an important role in shaping my teaching and in my work as a
member of the New Mexico Supreme Court’s Rules of Civil Procedure
Committee.
I. WRITING THE ARTICLE
New Mexico is a small state with only one law school. If the University of New
Mexico School of Law faculty does not research and write about New Mexico law,
it is unlikely that serious scholarship concerning New Mexico law will occur. With
this in mind, in 1985 my colleague, Michael Browde, and I identified an intriguing
issue that touched upon both civil procedure, which I teach, and constitutional law,
which Michael taught. In 1976, in Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc.,2 the
New Mexico Supreme Court boldly declared that the court not only had an inherent right to write rules of procedure for the courts but also that this power was
exclusively a judicial power.3 We were aware that the New Mexico Constitution
contains an explicit separation of powers provision4 but were also vaguely aware
that the New Mexico Legislature had often taken the lead in providing judicial
“rules” in statutory form,5 which the courts had applied without objection. We decided to write an article6 that would focus on the Ammerman opinion and would
explore the relationship of the court and the legislature in the creation of procedural rules of civil procedure.7
Almost immediately, the core structure of the article became clear, though we
still did not know the content that would fill in the structure. The article would
have three parts. First, it would survey the history of distribution of the rule-making power between the legislature and the judiciary from territorial days to Ammerman. Second, it would dissect the Ammerman opinion in light of that history,
* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law.
1. Michael B. Browde & M.E. Occhialino, Separation of Powers and the Judicial Rule-Making Power
in New Mexico: The Need for Prudential Constraints, 15 N.M. L. REV. 407 (1985).
2. 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976).
3. Id. at 312, 551 P.2d at 1359 (“under our Constitution the Legislature lacks power to prescribe by
statute rules of evidence and procedure, this constitutional power is vested exclusively in this court”).The
Ammerman ruling was foreshadowed in State ex. rel. Anaya v. McBride, 88 N.M. 244, 246, 539 P.2d 1006, 1008
(1975).
4. “[N]o person . . . charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of [the] departments, shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others. . . .” N.M. CONST. art. III, § 1.
5. See, e.g., Act of July 12, 1851, 1851 N.M. Laws 141.
6. Browde & Occhialino, supra note 1.
7. Because neither of us had a teaching or research interest in criminal law, the article focused on the
rules of civil procedure.
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determine its holding, and evaluate its reasoning. Third, the article would contain
our suggestions for how the courts and legislature should proceed to resolve potential conflicts in the future and how our suggestions could be implemented in the
post-Ammerman era. In addition, the article would contain an appendix, identifying and categorizing the separation of powers provisions in other states’
constitutions.
The first step was to learn the history of the rule-making power in New Mexico.
We used to tease our colleague, Professor Chris Fritz, who teaches courses in legal
history, by suggesting that he get his nose out of the history books and into twentieth century legal problems and solutions. No more. The historical research was
both fascinating and critical to the development of our thesis and our ultimate
proposals.
For twenty-six pages and with 172 footnotes, the “Historical Perspective” portion of the article traced the original source of New Mexico’s procedural rules, the
changes in the rules over time, and whether the source of those changes was the
judiciary or the legislature.8 The foundational law of New Mexico is the “Kearney
Code,”9 unilaterally imposed by General Kearney in 1846 following the American
occupation of Santa Fe during the Mexican War.10 The Code contained extensive
rules of judicial procedure,11 though it also delegated some rule-making authority
to the courts.12 Until the 1930s there was a clear pattern of legislative primacy in
rule-making, which was softened by a delegation from the legislature to the courts
of authority to participate in some aspects of the rule-making power.13 This
changed in 1933 when the legislature, influenced, we surmise, by the writings of
Roscoe Pound,14 adopted a statute15 which purported to delegate to the courts the
entirety of the legislative prerogative to write rules of procedure.16 The New Mexico Supreme Court quickly acted “subsequent to and consequent upon” the act to
do so,17 but in State v. Roy, declared that the newly enacted, judicially established
rules were created in the exercise of an inherent power rather than being sourced
in a delegation of power by the legislature in the 1933 act.18 The Roy court pointedly declined to address the question of whether the inherent judicial power to
write procedure rules also was a power exclusively within the realm of the judiciary
because there was “no conflict at the present time” between a statutory and a
judicial procedural rule19 and because “[a] constitutional question, and one so con-

8. See Browde & Occhialino, supra note 1, at 411–37.
9. See Kearney Code of Laws (1846), reprinted in NMSA 1978, Pamphlet 3: Territorial Laws and
Treaties 4–71.
10. See generally id. at 3.
11. A section of the Code, for example, is entitled “Practice at Law in Civil Suits.” Id. at 48–51,
§§ 1–17.
12. E.g., id. at 51, § 14. (“[Certain] pleadings shall be filed under oath, and in such time as the court
shall prescribe.”).
13. See Browde & Occhialino, supra note 1, at 413–20.
14. See id. at 425–27.
15. Act of Mar. 13, 1933, 1933 Laws 147, ch. 84.
16. See id. The 1933 act also provided that all existing statutes dealing with procedure should be
deemed rules of court subject to modification or suspension by the Court. See id.
17. State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 420, 60 P.2d 646, 660 (1936).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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troversial, should not be determined in advance of necessity.”20 These broad hints
in Roy that the New Mexico Supreme Court might someday assert that the rulemaking power was exclusively delegated to it by the New Mexcio Constitution set
the stage for the Ammerman case.
Our lengthy historical review predisposed us to be critical of any holding in
Ammerman that the rule-making power was exclusively delegated to the New
Mexico Supreme Court by the separation of powers provision of the New Mexico
Constitution.21 It also aided us in shaping our ultimate recommendations, which
were premised on the existence of a shared rule-making power with ultimate authority in the judiciary when conflicts arose.
The survey, and the appendix sorting out the separation of powers provisions of
the state constitutions, also inadvertently provided us with our main claim to a
measure of one standard of academic success—citations to our article in other academic journals. In preparing this retrospective piece, I did a Westlaw search to
determine if the article had been cited in journals. I was initially quite impressed to
learn that there were twenty citations. While ten of those were in the New Mexico
Law Review,22 as one would expect for a New Mexico-oriented article, ten were in
an array of other journals, including one with the magisterial word “Harvard” in
the title.23 To my dismay, though, the references in the national journals without
exception were of the “see generally” type, mostly using our appendix as a means
to avoid having to do independent research surveying state constitutional provisions as we had done.24 When another article referenced our specific New Mexico
history, it typically was in a single sentence or parenthetical to a footnote.25
Armed with the historical record, we were now prepared to mount an assault on
the Ammerman opinion, which seemed to contradict the historical record by claiming an exclusive power in the judiciary to provide procedural rules for the courts.
But the grand confrontation never took place. Ammerman’s broad assertion of
exclusive judicial power was tempered by the court’s suggestion that judicial power
was not necessarily exclusive, but only that “statutes purporting to regulate practice and procedure in the courts cannot be binding.”26 The court had both declared
its exclusive power and at the same time had left an opening for the later assertion
that rule-making power was shared with the legislature, with the court’s rules taking precedence if there were conflicts between a statutory and a judicial procedural
20. Id.
21. We also were convinced that another provision of the New Mexico Constitution, providing that
“[n]o act of the legislature shall . . . change the rules of evidence or procedure, in any pending case,” N.M.
CONST. art. IV, § 34, provided indisputable proof that the Constitution anticipated a role for the legislature in
the creation of rules governing judicial procedure.
22. Most of these citations were of the “see generally” variety, for example, William P. Lynch,
Problems with Court-Annexed Mandatory Arbitration: Illustrations from the New Mexico Experience, 32 N.M.
L. REV. 181 (2002), and in none of the articles was there an extended discussion of the merits of our position.
23. Alas, it was not the famed Harvard Law Review, but the Harvard Journal on Legislation. See Christopher P. Lu, The Role of State Courts in Narrowing Overbroad Speech Laws after Osborne v. Ohio, 28 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 253, 264 n.63 (1991).
24. See, e.g., id. (using our appendix as a means of avoiding independent research surveying state constitutional provisions).
25. See, e.g., Neil C. McCabe, Four Faces of State Constitutional Separation of Powers: Challenges to
Speedy Trial and Speedy Disposition Provisions, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 177, 184 n.59 (1989) (citing the article as
having conducted a “thorough review of conflict between legislature and judiciary over rule-making power”).
26. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 312, 551 P.2d 1354, 1359 (1976).
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rule. What for us was to be a bold criticism of the exclusivity ruling in Ammerman
became, instead, an acknowledgement that the opinion itself contained the support
for our thesis. We were not exposing the Ammerman apostasy; we were confirming
that it contained the seeds of orthodoxy and could be read as consistent with the
historical record and with our construction of the New Mexico Constitution.
We then concluded the article with “Some Prudential Guidelines for the Future.”27 They were modest proposals: abandonment of any claim for exclusivity;
return to shared authority with ultimate authority in the courts where clashes occur; and exercise of that ultimate judicial authority with restraint because legislative initiatives in rule-making could prove to be sound and appropriate. Finally, we
urged that the standing committees that advise the court on rule changes were the
preferred forums for considering whether to accept or reject newly adopted statutes that might have provisions affecting civil procedure.
II. IMPACT (OR NOT) ON NEW MEXICO LAW
While we did not expect that the article would have significant impact outside of
New Mexico, we were hopeful, if not confident, that the New Mexico Supreme
Court would use it as the centerpiece for all future cases raising the separation of
powers issue in rule-making disputes. It was not to be. Though the court largely
has followed the course we proposed, it has cited the article only six times, and the
article never became the focal point of a majority opinion.
The first reference was in a dissenting opinion, the justice noting simply that
“Ammerman has been criticized by scholars,” followed by citations to a national
treatise, our article, and a student note in another law journal.28 In Lovelace Medical Center v. Mendez,29 Justice Montgomery exercised constraint in the face of an
apparent conflict between statute and rule as the article had recommended, supporting his construction of the statute so as not to conflict with the rule, with the
sentence: “In recent years, this doctrine [of exclusive judicial power over rule-making] has come under sharp attack as representing a departure from coordinate
rulemaking power shared by the legislature and the judiciary.”30
The high-water mark (and the only identifiable mark) of our direct influence on
controlling New Mexico case law31 came in 2005 in Albuquerque Rape Crisis Center

27. See Browde & Occhialino, supra note 1, at 462–73.
28. Sw. Cmty. Health Servs. v. Smith, 107 N.M. 196, 202, 755 P.2d 40, 46 (1988) (Scarborough, C.J.,
dissenting).
29. 111 N.M. 336, 805 P.2d 603 (1991).
30. Id. at 339, 805 P.2d at 606 (citing Browde & Occhialino, supra note 1).
31. The article’s most extensive discussion in a New Mexico Supreme Court opinion occurred in a
dissenting opinion. In State v. Maples, 110 N.M. 34, 791 P.2d 788 (1990), Justice Montgomery’s dissenting
opinion cited the article for proof that administrative proceedings were outside the scope of the rule-making
power, see id. at 42, 791 P.2d at 796, and that the traditional distinction between substance and procedure is
too imprecise to clearly mark the boundary between legislative and judicial functions, see id. at 40–41, 791 P.2d
at 794–95. He also approved of the article’s rejection of Ammerman’s claim that the rule-making power was
exclusively for the courts. See id. at 38, 791 P.2d at 792. Justice Montgomery’s intriguing central theme, never
adopted by the court, went beyond that of the article, implicitly criticizing the article as not being sufficiently
deferential to the role of the legislature. Where we would honor statutory procedure provisions only until they
conflicted with a procedural rule of court, Justice Montgomery would permit statutes affecting the judicial
process to control even in the presence of an inconsistent rule under some circumstances: “In resolving an
issue as to whether a statute or a court rule should prevail, this Court should focus on the purpose and effect of
the statute and whether it does or does not trench upon the ability of courts to discharge their constitutional
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v. Blackmer.32 Justice Chavez, writing for the majority, demonstrated a delicate
touch in upholding a statute that seemingly provided for a statutory evidentiary
privilege that would have been contrary to the Ammerman holding that any statutory privilege must yield to a contrary rule of evidence—in this case the rule of
evidence that provides that only constitutionally mandated or court-adopted privileges are applicable in judicial proceedings.33 Justice Chavez premised his opinion
on the rejection of the assertion that Ammerman gave exclusive rule-making
power to the judiciary and cited the article in support of that premise.34 He concluded that the statutory “privilege” was sufficiently analogous to an existing judicially created privilege35 such that it was fairly incorporated into the court’s rule
creating that privilege.36
Writing in dissent, Justice Bosson acknowledged that the article urged a less
confrontational approach to the separation of powers question,37 but concluded
that even if that approach were followed, the statute must yield to the contrary
rule of evidence barring legislative privileges.38 He suggested that the appropriate
method for considering whether to accommodate the legislative goal was for the
Rules Committee to evaluate the statute and adopt a new privilege rule if the
purpose of the legislation was sound.39
In retrospect, the article suffered the fate of most law review articles. It had
miniscule influence on the work of other scholars and did not have a profound
influence on New Mexico jurisprudence. The central premise of the article—that
Ammerman’s assertion of exclusive rule-making power in the judiciary was ahistoric, unwise, and dictum—was certainly correct but probably would have been
recognized as such by the New Mexico Supreme Court on its own in the course of
resolving post-Ammerman issues. Our recommended “prudential constraints” in
resolving apparent conflicts are still sound and are being applied by the court,

duties.” Id. at 40, 791 P.2d at 794. Citing State ex rel. Bliss v. Greenwood, 63 N.M. 156, 162, 315 P.2d 223, 227
(1957), Justice Montgomery apparently would not void a statute that “implements a legislative policy external
to the functioning of the courts” unless the legislation would undercut the court’s “ability to perform its essential functions,” or would “interfere with the effective and efficient operation of the courts.” Maples, 110 N.M.
at 40, 791 P.2d at 794 (citing Bliss, 63 N.M. at 161–62, 315 P.2d at 227).
32. See 2005-NMSC-032, ¶ 5, 120 P.3d 820, 822.
33. See Rule 11-501 NMRA; Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, ¶ 1, 120 P.3d at 821.
34. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, ¶ 5, 120 P.3d at 822 (“While this Court has ultimate rule-making authority, the analysis in Ammerman and subsequent cases which interpret legislative enactments concerning
practice and procedure do not support the broad statement that our rule-making authority is exclusive.” (citing Browde & Occhialino, supra note 6, at 437 (“A careful reading of the cases and subsequent decisions
applying them suggests, however, that the supreme court intended not to exclude the legislature from the rulemaking process but only intended to assure judicial supremacy in any clash between legislative and judicial
rules of procedure.”))).
35. Rule 11-504 NMRA (concerning the physician-patient and psychotherapist-patient privileges).
36. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, ¶¶ 14–17, 120 P.3d at 825–26.
37. Id. ¶ 32, 120 P.3d at 829 (Bosson, C.J., dissenting). In a recent opinion dealing with the power of the
judiciary to grant use immunity in criminal cases, Justice Bosson acknowledged that the article urges a restrained approach to legislative and judicial clashes in the rule-making arena, but pointedly noted that, even
so, the article can be viewed as “charting an increasingly court-centered power over rules of procedure and
pleading.” State v. Belanger, 2009-NMSC-025, ¶ 34, 210 P.3d 783, 792.
38. See Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, ¶ 38, 120 P.3d at 830 (Bosson, C.J., dissenting). This preferred
resolution is consistent with a proposal in the article. See Browde & Occhialino, supra note 6, at 472–73.
39. See Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, ¶ 33, 120 P.3d at 829.
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though Justice Bosson has expressed the view that Ammerman held that the creation of evidentiary privileges, at least, is exclusively for the court.40
III. UNFORESEEN ISSUES
There were some issues we did not see when we wrote the article that later
surfaced. We did not explore the ramifications of the fact that the jurisdictional
limits of some courts are the proper subject of legislation and the different analysis
of legislative/judicial conflicts that arise in this context.41 We did not anticipate that
courts might conclude that a procedural rule that did not contradict a procedural
statute, but merely was silent on a matter that was the subject of a procedural
statute, could create a conflict with the statute by its silence, thus voiding the statute.42 Finally, we never anticipated that a procedural statute would be valid because not inconsistent with a rule, but that the court would assert an inherent
power to excuse non-compliance with the statutory command in individual cases
even in the absence of a statutory provision authorizing exceptions.43
In sum, I can say about the article what professors sometimes say about average
exam answers: “It’s not great, but at least it did not detract from the sum total of
human knowledge.”
IV. THE ARTICLE IMPACTED ME
Nonetheless, the article has had significant influence on me if not on fellow
academicians or the judicial opinions of New Mexico courts.44 I prepare and use
my own materials in my civil procedure courses. The first chapter used to consist of
the standard “Forum Selection” jurisdictional materials. Now I open with a full
chapter titled “The Rule-Making Power.” It starts with an analysis of the source of
the rule-making power in the federal system, which evolved along very different
lines from that of New Mexico, and which provides that while the Congress and
Supreme Court have shared rule-making power it is the legislature and not the
Court that has the final say.45 The chapter then contrasts the New Mexico approach, focusing on Ammerman and the post-Ammerman cases. For this reason, I
am prepared to agree with the oft-repeated statement that writing law review articles can provide insights that enhance one’s teaching.
As a longtime member of the New Mexico Supreme Court Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts Committee, I also have had numerous occasions to

40. Id. ¶ 27, 120 P.3d at 828 (“[I]n Ammerman . . . [w]e overturned the Legislature’s privilege, not
because we disagreed with it or found it inconsistent, but because the legislature was overstepping its constitutional boundaries and intruding into an area in which power was vested ‘exclusively’ in the Court.”).
41. See Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 111 N.M. 336, 339, 805 P.2d 603, 606 (1991); Maples v. State, 110
N.M. 34, 36–37, 791 P.2d 788, 790–91 (1990); Seth D. Montgomery & Andrew S. Montgomery, Jurisdiction as
May Be Provided by Law: Some Issues of Appellate Jurisdiction in New Mexico, 36 N.M. L. REV. 215 (2006).
42. See Albuquerque Redi-Mix, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 2007-NMSC-051, ¶¶ 11–13, 168 P.3d 99,
102–03.
43. Mendez, 111 N.M. at 339, 805 P.2d at 606 (stating that the “legislative adoption of a housekeeping
rule to assist the courts with the management of their cases [is] to have effect unless and until waiver by a court
in a particular case” or changed by an inconsistent rule of court).
44. On a personal note, writing the article with Michael Browde forged a personal friendship and a
professional relationship that has survived for twenty-five years. That alone justifies the effort that went into
the article.
45. See, e.g., Jackson v. Stinnett, 102 F.3d 132, 134 (5th Cir. 1996).
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practice what we preached in the article about using rules committees as the most
appropriate forums for resolving potential or actual conflicts between the legislative and judicial branches over the rule-making power. The Committee has been
assiduous in searching out areas of potential conflict and seeking to resolve them
through accommodation if possible46 and when that is not possible, explaining the
reasoning that led the Committee to recommend that a procedural rule be adopted
that preempts the procedural statute.47

46. See, e.g., Rule 1-068(C) NMRA (providing that costs can be awarded either pursuant to the rule or
consistent with a similar statute, but not both).
47. See, e.g., Rule 1.054.1 NMRA, 2006 Committee Comment (explaining reasons for superseding portion of section 39-1-1 of the New Mexico Statutes Annotated, which provided that any post-judgment motion
made in trial court was deemed denied if not granted within thirty days).

